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The text published below1 is the translation of a part of this published article: Il Dio che rischia e che 
cambia: introduzione all’Open Theism, in Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia della Religione (2018), 
online. …… 
https://www.filosofiadellareligione.it/images/Bibliografia/PDF/Migliorini_Dio_che_rischia_introduzione_allOpen_Theism_DEF.pdf 
 
The issue of omniscience is one of the most debated in contemporary Analytical Philosophy of 
Religion. However, what is often lacking in this discussion is a deep understanding of the dilemma 
of omniscience and human freedom within a complete epistemological (what can we really say about 
the divine and the world), metaphysical and theological framework. For example, it is often forgotten 
to frame some issues within a clear definition of the notion of mystery. 
 
I defined what we can mean by “mystery” in this forthcoming article: Trinity and Mystery. Three 
Models: Aquinas, Leibniz, and Hegel 
 
In the same article (and also in the first article mentioned above) can be found a reflection on the 
analogical use of terms, which involve the terms (the notions) of “freedom” and “omniscience”. This 
use, therefore, could make possible to develop the following argument:  
 
*** 
(from the article Il Dio che rischia e che cambia, paragraph 5.1) 
 
About  omniscience and human freedom, hypothetically, an unexplored path in today’s debate 
within Analytical Philosophy of Religion and Open Theism supporters, consists in formulating an 
argument ex suppositione very similar to the strategy developed by Aquinas (in line with a venerable 
apologetic tradition) on the Trinity: given that God exists and is necessarily omniscient in order to be 
God, and assuming that human beings must be free (in a libertarian sense), we can say that, until the 
two concepts (omniscience and human freedom) are not evidently in contradiction between them, 
they remain compatible ex suppositione. God knows how in his beatific vision (in his complete 
theology), but to us the “how” is not given.  
We do not know exactly how they are compatible (because we lack the detailed and precise 
explanation of how divine knowledge and his causation take place: we just talk about them with 
analogical terms), but a doctrine that is not proven to be contradictory (and here ockhamism and 
molinism can certainly help to block the argument in favour of the contradictoriness)2 can be believed 
as true. Problems arise where it is assumed that the definition of omniscience and the definition of 
human freedom are one the negation of the other: at this point we would have no escape from a 
manifest contradiction (and the doctrine would be contradictory ex suppositione). 
                                                          
1 English version not revised by a proofreader. 
2 Cf. D. Migliorini, L’ockhamismo nel dibattito analitico contemporaneo sull’onniscienza divina. Un bilancio, in 
«Laurentianum», n. 56, 2015, pp. 33-86; D. Migliorini, Prospettive del molinismo nel dibattito contemporaneo 
sull’onniscienza divina, Verifiche 44 (2015), pp. 71-106.  
However, in order to avoid the contradiction, the analogical use of terms could be emphasized, 
recognizing that the knowledge (and his science) of God is infinitely qualitatively different from the 
human one (due to His simplicity), and that also about human freedom we only have an analogical 
concept, never completely precise. In the necessary ambiguity of the analogical use of terms, 
therefore, we would also have the possibility of their reconciliation (given that the analogy never 
allows to express a real contradiction).  
The choice between dialectical theology (within which a large part of non-standard theisms 
fall, which in turn are based on the univocity of being, therefore of ontological categories) and 
analogical theology is impervious. In fact, it seems that we cannot choose between accepting 
dialecticity or affirming analogy. If it is recognized that in Open and Classical Theism the terms 
freedom, omniscience (etc.) are used with approximation – not having a clear (univocal) concept of 
neither – then the reconciliation between omniscience and human freedom would be a non-problem 
for theism. 
If this is true, the entire theoretical enterprise carried out by Open Theism would consist of an 
awkward attempt to dispel a mystery. A mystery that, on the contrary, can remain credible where it 
is recognized that the reconciliation between human freedom and divine omniscience (in the 
analogical use of these terms) is beyond reason but not against reason. 
 
